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DONNA W. MCKENZIE-SKENE*
Directors' Duty to Creditors of a Financially
Distressed Company:
A Perspective from Across the Pond
I. INTRODUCTION
THERE HAS RECENTLY BEEN A REVIVAL OF INTEREST IN THE subject of the directors'
duty to creditors where the company is financially distressed,' and it was consid-
ered in some detail by the Company Law Review Steering Group, which was set up
by the British government to review core company law in 19982 and reported in
2001? Although the duty is now generally regarded as well-established in princi-
ple,4 there are important aspects of it that remain unclear, and the role of the duty
in modern law has been questioned. This Article briefly outlines the development
Senior Lecturer, School of Law, University of Aberdeen. I am grateful to Judith Pearson, formerly
School of Law, University of Aberdeen, and Rachel Grant, Messrs. Semple Fraser, Edinburgh, for helpful
comments on an earlier draft of this Article; any errors remain the responsibility of the author.
1. See generally Andrew Keay, The Duty of Directors to Take Account of Creditors' Interests: Has It Any Role
to Play?, 2002 J. Bus. L. 379 (U.K.) [hereinafter Keay, The Duty of Directors]; Andrew Keay, Directors' Duties to
Creditors: Contractarian Concerns Relating to Efficiency and Over-Protection of Creditors, 66 M.L.R. 665 (2003)
(U.K.) [hereinafter Keay, Contractarian Concerns]; Andrew Keay, Directors Taking into Account Creditors Inter-
ests, 24 Co. LAW. 300 (2003) (U.K.) [hereinafter Keay, Directors Taking into Account]; Andrew Keay, Another
Way of Skinning a Cat: Enforcing Directors' Duties for the Benefit of Creditors, 2004 INSOLV. INT. 1 [hereinafter
Keay, Another Way of Skinning a Cat]; David Milman, Strategies for Regulating Managerial Performance in the
"TwilightZone"-Familiar Dilemmas: New Considerations, 2004 J. Bus. L. 493 (U.K.); Andrew Keay, A Theoreti-
cal Analysis of the Director's Duty to Consider Creditor Interests: The Progressive School's Approach, 4 J.C.L.S. 307
(2004) (U.K.) [hereinafter Keay, A Theoretical Analysis]; Andrew Keay, Directors' Duties-Do Recent Canadian
Developments Require a Rethink in the United Kingdom on the Issue of the Directors' Duties to Consider Creditor
Interests, 2005 INSOLV. INT. 65; see also VANESSA FINCH, CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW: PERSPECTIVES AND
PRINCIPLES (2002). The duty may, in fact, be more accurately expressed as a duty to take into account the
interests of creditors that arise where those interests are at risk, but this is a familiar and convenient shorthand
that will accordingly be used here.
2. See generally Co. LAw INVESTIGATIONS & DIRECTORATE, MODERN COMPANY LAW FOR A COMPETITIVE
ECONOMY (Mar. 1998).
3. See generally Co. LAW REV. STEERING GROUP, MODERN COMPANY LAW FOR A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY:
FINAL REPORT (June 2001) [hereinafter Co. LAW REV. STEERING GROUP, FINAL REPORT].
4. Although it has been argued that no such specific duty in fact exists because in each of the cases where
it has been referred to, liability was clearly based on other grounds. See L.S. Sealy, Directors' Duties-An Unnec-
essary Gloss, 47 C.L.J. 175 (1988) (Eng.) [hereinafter Sealy, Directors' Duties-An Unnecessary Gloss]; see also
L.S. Sealy, Personal Liability of Directors and Officers for Debts of Insolvent Corporations: A Jurisdictional Perspec-
tive (England), in CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE CORPORATE INSOLVENCY
LAW 485, 486-87 (Jacob S. Ziegel ed., 1994) [hereinafter Sealy, Personal Liability of Directors and Officers].
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of the duty in Great Britain before exploring the uncertainties surrounding the
duty, the treatment of the duty by the Company Law Review Steering Group, the
government's response, and the role of the duty in modern British law.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DUTY IN GREAT BRITAIN
As has been noted elsewhere,5 the development of the duty has been well docu-
mented,6 but a brief outline is useful here. The development of the duty in Great
Britain builds on Commonwealth authority. The duty is generally regarded as
originating in the famous dictum of Mason J. in the Australian High Court case of
Walker v. Wimborne: "[iun discharging their duty to the company," the directors
are required to take into account "the interests of its shareholders and its creditors.
Any failure . . . to take [the creditors' interests into account] will have adverse
consequences for the company" and for the creditors themselves! The approach in
that case was followed in other Commonwealth cases that have also influenced the
development of the law in Great Britain, most notably Nicholson v. Permakraft
(NZ) Ltd.9 and Kinsela v. Russell Kinsela Pty Ltd.' °
In Great Britain, the first signs of recognition of the duty appeared in Lonrho
Ltd. v. Shell Petroleum Co. Ltd.," where Lord Diplock stated that the best interests
of the company, in which the directors were bound to act, were "not exclusively
those of its shareholders but may include those of its creditors."' 2 Other cases fol-
lowed. In Re Horsley & Weight Ltd.," Buckley L.J. spoke of directors owing an
indirect duty to creditors not to permit any unlawful reduction of capital. 4 In
5. See, e.g, Keay, The Duty of Directors, supra note 1, at 381.
6. See, e.g., Sealy, Directors' Duties-An Unnecessary Gloss, supra note 4, at 175-77; Neil Hawke, Credi-
tors' Interests in Solvent and Insolvent Companies, 1989 J. Bus. L. 54, 54 (U.K.); Vanessa Finch, Directors' Duties
Towards Creditors, 1989 Co. LAW. 23 [hereinafter Finch, Directors' Duties Towards Creditors]; C. Riley, Directors'
Duties and the Interests of Creditors, 1989 Co. LAW. 87, 87 [hereinafter Riley, Directors' Duties]; see generally
D.D. Prentice, Creditor's Interests and Director's Duties, 10 O.J.L.S. 265 (1990) (Eng.) [hereinafter Prentice,
Creditor's Interests]; Ross Grantham, The Judicial Extension of Directors' Duties to Creditors, 1991 J. Bus. L., 1
(U.K.) [hereinafter Grantham, The Judicial Extension]; Ross Grantham, Directors' Duties and Insolvent Compa-
nies, 54 M.L.R. 576 (1991) (U.K.); Razeen Sappideen, Fiduciary Obligations to Corporate Creditors, 1991 J. Bus.
L. 365 (U.K.); Vanessa Finch, Directors' Duties: Insolvency and the Unsecured Creditor, in CURRENT ISSUES IN
INSOLVENCY LAW 87 (A. Clarke ed., 1991) [hereinafter Finch, Insolvency and the Unsecured Creditor]; D.D.
Prentice, Directors, Creditors, and Shareholders, in COMMERCIAL ASPECTS OF TRUSTS AND FIDUCIARY OBLIGA-
TIONS 73 (Ewan McKendrick, ed. 1992) [hereinafter Prentice, Directors, Creditors, and Shareholders]; Ross
Grantham, The Content of the Director's Duty of Loyalty, 1993 J. Bus. L. 149 (U.K.); Sealy, Personal Liability of
Directors and Officers, supra note 4; CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW: MODERN DEVELOPMENTS 173 (David
Feldman & Frank Meisel eds., 1996) [hereinafter CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW]; see also sources cited
accompanying supra note 1.
7. (1976) 137 C.L.R. 1 (Austl.).
8. Id. at 7.
9. [1985] 1 N.Z.L.R. 242 (C.A.).
10. (1986) 4 N.S.W.L.R. 722 (Austl.).
11. [1980] 1 W.L.R. 627 (H.L.(E.)) (Eng.).
12. Id. at 634.
13. [1982] 3 All E.R. 1045 (C.A.) (Eng.).
14. Id. at 1055-56.
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Multinational Gas and Petrochemical Co. v. Multinational Gas and Petrochemical
Services Ltd.," Dillon L.J. appeared not to recognise the existence of the duty, stat-
ing clearly that directors owed fiduciary duties to the company but not to the credi-
tors, present or future. 6 In the later case of West Mercia Safetywear Ltd. v. Dodd,7
however, he distinguished Multinational Gas and Petrochemical Co. on the basis
that in that case, the company had been amply solvent,'8 and he went on to quote
with approval another famous dictum, that of Street J. in Kinsela v. Russell Kinsela
Pty Ltd.,' 9 to the effect that "where a company is insolvent, the interests of the
creditors intrude [and] [t]hey become prospectively entitled ...to displace the
power of the ...directors to deal with the company's assets ... [because] in a
practical sense [the company's assets are their assets]. "
The existence of the duty was also recognized by the House of Lords in Wink-
worth v. Edward Baron Development Co. Ltd.,2' the Court of Appeal in Brady v.
Brady,2 and indirectly in Re Welfab Engineers Ltd., and, more recently, in Yukong
Lines of Korea v. Rendsberg Investment Corp. of Liberia (No. 2)," Facia Footwear Ltd.
v. Hinchcliffe,25 Clydebank Football Club Ltd. v. Steedman,26 Re Pantone 485 Ltd.,27
Colin Gwyer & Associates Ltd. v. London Wharf (Limehouse) Ltd.,2' and Re MDA
Investment Management Ltd.29
III. UNCERTAINTIES SURROUNDING THE DUTY
A. Direct or Indirect Duty?
Perhaps the most important area of uncertainty has been the question of whether
the duty is an independent one owed directly to creditors, with the result that any
creditor can take steps to enforce it against the directors, or whether it is an indirect
one owed to the company to take account of the creditors' interests, with the result
that it can be enforced only by the company."
15. [1983] 2 All E.R. 563 (C.A.) (Eng.).
16. Id. at 585.
17. 11988] B.C.L.C. 250 (C.A.) (Eng.).
18. Id. at 252. The significance of the solvency or otherwise of the company to the existence of the duty is
discussed further below.
19. (1986) 4 N.S.W.L.R. 722 (Austl.).
20. West Mercia Safetywear, [1988] B.C.L.C. at 253 (quoting Kinsela, 4 N.S.W.L.R. at 730).
21. 119871 1 All E.R. 114 (H.L.) (Eng.).
22. [1987] 3 B.C.C. 535 (C.A.) (Eng.). The decision was reversed on the facts in the House of Lords, but
nothing that was said there detracted from the Court of Appeal's recognition of the duty.
23. 11990] B.C.C. 600 (Ch.) (Eng.).
24. 119981 B.C.C. 870 (Q.B.D. (Comm.)) (Eng.).
25. [1998] 1 B.C.L.C. 218 (Eng.).
26. 2002 S.L.T. 109 (Scot.).
27. [2002] 1 B.C.L.C. 266 (Ch.) (Eng.).
28. 12003] 2 B.C.L.C. 153 (Ch.) (Eng.).
29. [2005] B.C.C. 783 (Ch.) (Eng.). For a discussion of some of these more recent cases, see Keay, Directors
Taking Into Account, supra note 1, at 303-05; see also Keay, Another Way of Skinning a Cat, supra note 1.
30. Or, in practice, the company's liquidator, administrator or receiver.
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The preponderance of authority favors the latter interpretation. In Walker v.
Wimborne,5 1 the duty was expressed as one owed to the company, 2 and this ap-
proach is reflected either expressly or impliedly in all but one of the British cases
referred to above. The exception is Winkworth v. Edward Baron Development Co.
Ltd.," where Lord Templeman stated that "[a] duty is owed by the directors to the
company and to the creditors of the company to ensure that the affairs of the com-
pany are properly administered and that its property is not dissipated or exploited
for the benefit of the directors themselves to the prejudice of the creditors."34 This
can be interpreted as implying that there is a specific, separate duty to the credi-
tors."5 As indicated, however, this is inconsistent with the approach taken in the
other British cases, and indeed, the concept of a direct duty to creditors was specifi-
cally rejected in the later case of Yukong Lines of Korea v. Rendsberg Investment Corp.
of Liberia (No. 2),36 where Toulson J. said that a director "does not owe a direct
fiduciary duty ... [to] an individual creditor, nor is an individual creditor entitled
to sue for breach of the fiduciary duty owed by the director to the company."3 7
It should be noted that neither approach is wholly free from difficulty. Potential
problems that have been suggested with formulating the duty as an indirect one
owed to the company include: whether the interests of creditors are to be consid-
ered independently or only in so far as they are relevant to the company's interests;
whether creditors' interests are part of a "package" of claims including shareholders
and employees and, if so, how any conflicts of interests should be resolved; and
whether directorial consideration of creditors' interests is to be assessed subjectively
or objectively. These issues are discussed further below. Formulating the duty,
however, as a direct one enforceable by individual creditors may be even more
problematic, in spite of some apparent advantages. Although it has been said that a
direct duty might appear to have the advantages of rendering the duty more effec-
tive by placing enforcement in the hands of those with the keenest interest in en-
forcement and of directing the proceeds of a successful action to the particular
creditor taking the action, in fact, it is questionable to what extent these advantages
would materialize." Allowing a direct action "would invite a multiplicity of actions,
encourage litigation and incur considerable time and expense, all of which would
be lessened if the company were the only possible [litigant]."" It has also been said
31. (1976) 137 C.L.R. 1 (Austl.).
32. Id. at 7.
33. [1987] 1 All E.R. 114 (H.L.) (Eng.).
34. Id. at 118 (emphasis added).
35. See FINCH, CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW, supra note 1, at 500.
36. [1998] B.C.C. 870 (Q.B.D. (Comm.)) (Eng.).
37. Id. at 884.
38. FINCH, CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAw, supra note 1, at 501. See also Grantham, The Judicial Extension,
supra note 6, at 4-13.
39. See Riley, Directors' Duties, supra note 6, at 276. The question of enforcement is discussed further
below.
40. Id.
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that allowing a direct action by creditors would create the potential for double
recovery.41 Mediating the duty through the company has the advantage of preserv-
ing an important principle of insolvency law, the pari passu principle, by prevent-
ing any one creditor from stealing a march on other creditors and "preserv[ing] the
procedural monopoly of liquidation proceedings for dealing with the claims of
creditors against an insolvent company."42 It has further been said that if one ac-
cepts the neoclassical view of the company as dedicated to profit maximization,
with the directors as agents of that profit maximization, a direct duty to creditors
cuts across this, and a direct duty to creditors does not sit easily alongside the
board's existing fiduciary duties.4 The question of the nature of a direct duty, i.e.,
whether it should be regarded as an extension of the directors' duty of care or as
grounded in tortious principles, has also been raised.44
B. Who Are the Creditors?
The duty is usually expressed in the most general of terms as a duty to (take ac-
count of the interests of) the creditors, but which creditors? One issue here is
whether the duty is confined to existing creditors or extends to future creditors.
Most of the cases are silent on the matter, but in Winkworth v. Edward Baron Devel-
opment Co. Ltd.,45 Lord Templeman clearly included future creditors.46 In contrast,
in Brady v. Brady,47 Nourse J. confined his formulation of the duty to existing
creditors;48 and in Nicholson v. Permakraft (NZ) Ltd.,49 Cooke J. took the view that
future creditors would normally take the company as it was and could look after
their own interests."0 The latter approach has, however, been criticized on the basis
that once the company has reached the stage where insolvent liquidation is inevita-
41. See Prentice, Creditor's Interests, supra note 6, at 276; Prentice, Directors, Creditors, and Shareholders,
supra note 6, at 74.
42. See Prentice, Creditor's Interests, supra note 6, at 276; Prentice, Directors, Creditors, and Shareholders,
supra note 6, at 75. Similar points are made in Finch, Insolvency and the Unsecured Creditor, supra note 6, at
104. In relation to the last point, it should be noted that even if the duty is mediated through the company, it
may fall to be enforced otherwise than on liquidation, for example, on administration or on the appointment
of a receiver.
43. Grantham, The Judicial Extension, supra note 6, at 12.
44. See, e.g., FINCH, CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW, supra note 1, at 499. It should also be noted in this
context that it has been pointed out that the remedies for a breach of the directors' fiduciary duty differ to
some extent from the remedies for a breach of the director's duty of care with important practical implications.
See Alan Berg, The Company Law Review: Legislating Directors' Duties, 2000 J. Bus. L. 472, 478-79 (U.K.).
45. [19871 1 All E.R. 114 (H.L.) (Eng.).
46. Id. at 118.
47. [1987] 3 B.C.C. 535 (C.A.) (Eng.). The decision was reversed on the facts in the House of Lords, but
nothing that was said there detracted from the Court of Appeal's recognition of the duty.
48. Id. at 552.
49. [1985] 1 N.Z.L.R. 242 (C.A.).
50. Id. at 250.
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ble, there is little justification for differentiating between the two groups of
creditors."
The issue is important because the interests of present and future creditors may
conflict.52 So too may the interests of existing creditors: several commentators have
noted that creditors are not a homogenous group and may have conflicting inter-
ests and that there is little guidance for directors who have to choose between com-
peting interests.5 3 Some further guidance can now be found in the recent decision
in Re Pantone 485 Ltd., 4 where Richard Field Q.C. stated that the "creditors" meant
the "creditors as a whole, ie [the] general creditors[,] ... [and] that if the directors
act[ed] consistently with the interests of the general creditors but inconsistently
with the interest of a creditor or section of creditors with special rights in a wind-
ing up, they... [would not be] in breach of [their] duty to the company."5 This
still leaves a number of questions unanswered, however, for example, what precisely
is meant by "general creditors" and "creditors with special rights in a winding up?"56
Which creditors should benefit from any such duty? Finch has argued that the
duty should be construed as being owed to the unsecured creditors as a class, and
that this would give meaningful guidance to directors without being prejudicial to
secured creditors who would still be able to take steps to enforce their security.57 Re
Pantone 485 Ltd."5 may lead to this result if "general creditors" can be regarded as
unsecured creditors and "creditors with special rights in winding up"59 (whose in-
terests must give way to the interests of the general creditors) can be regarded as
including secured creditors, but this is not entirely clear. A more sophisticated for-
mulation suggested by Lipson is that the duty should be owed only to those credi-
tors with low levels of volition, cognition, and exit-namely tort creditors, certain
terminated employees, taxing authorities, and certain trade creditors.6 ° As he him-
self acknowledges, however, such an approach has implications that may require
further consideration. Whatever approach is taken, it is arguable that some distinc-
51. Riley, Directors' Duties, supra note 6, at 90. But see Grantham, The Judicial Extension, supra note 6, at 7.
The issue of insolvency is discussed further below.
52. Finch gives as an example a decision to go into administration, which may reap economic and social
dividends in the future but may involve existing debts being frozen, subordinated, or written off. See Finch,
Insolvency and the Unsecured Creditor, supra note 6, at 103.
53. See, e.g., Riley, Directors' Duties, supra note 6, at 90; Finch, Insolvency and the Unsecured Creditor, supra
note 6, at 103; FINCH, CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW, supra note 1, at 501-02.
54. [20021 1 B.C.L.C. 266 (Ch.) (Eng.).
55. Id. at 286-87. In that case, the creditor in question was a preferential creditor. See also Re MDA Inv.
Mgmt. Ltd., [2005] B.C.C 783 (Ch.) (Eng.), where Park J. also referred to the interests of the company's
creditors as a whole, although without elaborating on that concept.
56. Re Pantone, [2002] 1 B.C.L.C. at 286-87.
57. See Finch, Insolvency and the Unsecured Creditor, supra note 6, at 104; FINCH, CORPORATE INSOLVENCY
LAW, supra note 1, at 502.
58. [2002] 1 B.C.L.C. 266 (Ch.) (Eng.).
59. Id. at 286-87.
60. Jonathan C. Lipson, Directors' Duties to Creditors: Power Imbalance and the Financially Distressed Cor-
poration, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1189, 1245-49 (2003).
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tion must be made in order to ensure that the duty is capable of operating
effectively."
C. Are Creditors' Interests Entitled to Exclusive Consideration?
Case law is inconsistent as to whether the directors must consider the interests of
creditors exclusively when the duty arises or whether, and to what extent, they can
take other interests into account. The question of when the duty arises is consid-
ered in more detail below, but must be mentioned briefly here because the circum-
stances in which the duty arises are relevant to assessing the weight to be given to
creditors' interests at that point, which is also discussed further below. At this
point, it should suffice to say that the duty is generally regarded as arising when the
company is either insolvent or in some degree of financial distress or where a pro-
posed course of action is likely to render the company insolvent.
Some of the cases are silent or ambiguous on this issue, although others are
clearer but point in contrary directions. In Brady v. Brady,62 for example, Nourse J.
said that "where the company is insolvent, or even doubtfully solvent, the interests
of the company are in reality the interests of existing creditors alone."63 This clearly
suggests an exclusive focus on creditor interests. Finch suggests that such an ap-
proach is consistent with the approach of Street J. in Kinsela v. Russell Kinsela Pty
Ltd.," referred to above, to the effect that where a company is insolvent, it is in a
practical sense the creditors' assets that are being managed by the directors." It is
suggested, however, that the comments of Street J. are not in fact entirely unambig-
uous in this respect. As noted above, these comments were approved, without elab-
oration, by Dillon L.J. in West Mercia Safetywear Ltd. v. Dodd,66 but the latter case
has been cited in subsequent cases as authority both for the proposition that the
creditors' interests become paramount in an insolvency situation,67 and for the pro-
position that the creditors' interests in an insolvency situation require to be taken
into account in addition to the interests of shareholders.66 In Re Pantone 485 Ltd.,69
Richard Field Q.C. also said that "it [was] ... firmly established that when a com-
pany becomes insolvent, the directors must act in the interests of [its] creditors and
not its shareholders," 7' again suggesting an exclusive focus on creditor interests. He
61. See, e.g., FINCH, CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW, supra note 1, at 502.
62. [1987] 3 B.C.C. 535 (C.A.) (Eng.). The decision was reversed on the facts in the House of Lords, but
nothing that was said there detracted from the Court of Appeal's recognition of the duty.
63. Id. at 552.
64. (1986) 4 N.S.W.L.R. 722 (Austl.).
65. Compare FINCH, CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW, supra note 1, at 503, with Kinsela, 4 N.S.W.L.R. at 730.
66. [1988] B.C.L.C. 250 (C.A.) (Eng.).
67. See Colin Gwyer & Assoc. Ltd. v. London Wharf (Limehouse) Ltd., [2003] 2 B.C.L.C. 153 (Eng.)
(citing Brady v. Brady, [1987] 3 B.C.C. 535 (C.A.) (Eng.), in support of the proposition).
68. See, e.g., Clydebank Football Club Ltd. v. Steedman, 2002 S.L.T. 109 (Scot.); see also Re MDA Inv.
Mgmt. Ltd., [2005] B.C.C. 783 (Ch.) (Eng.).
69. [2002] 1 B.C.L.C. 266 (Eng).
70. Id. at 285.
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cited as authority for this proposition Re Horsley & Weight Ltd.,7 but it is doubtful
whether the latter case can be said to support such a sweeping statement. The
statement of Nourse J. in Brady v. Brady72 is clear and unambiguous, but it is the
only such clear and unambiguous statement to be found in the British authorities.
In contrast, many of the other cases that touch on the matter seem to favor an
approach where creditors' interests are considered alongside other interests, partic-
ularly the interests of the shareholders. In Walker v. Wimborne," Mason J. spoke of
the need for directors to take into account the interests of shareholders and credi-
tors, although he did not limit the duty to cases of insolvency or financial distress.74
In Nicholson v. Permakraft (NZ) Ltd.,75 Cooke J. spoke of the need for the directors,
on the facts of particular cases, to consider, inter alia, the interests of creditors and
said that creditors were entitled to consideration in what is here described loosely
as various circumstances related to insolvency.76 There is nothing to suggest, how-
ever, that creditors' interests should be considered exclusively in those circum-
stances. In Lonrho Ltd. v. Shell Petroleum Co. Ltd.,77 as noted above, Lord Diplock
stated that the best interests of the company in which the directors were bound to
act were not exclusively those of the shareholders, but might include those of its
creditors, thus clearly requiring the directors to take account of both, although
again the duty was not limited to cases of insolvency or financial distress.78 In both
Clydebank Football Club Ltd. v. Steedman79 and Re MDA Investment Management
Ltd.,"0 the matter was approached on the basis that the interests of creditors had to
be taken into account as well as the interests of shareholders where the company
was insolvent or in financial difficulty.8 Finally, it should be noted that in Re
Welfab Engineers Ltd., 2 Hoffmann J. (as he was then) held that the directors were
entitled to take into account, inter alia, the interests of employees when considering
various offers for the company's business, although they were not entitled to sell
the business to save their jobs and those of the other employees of the company on
terms that would clearly leave the creditors in a worse position than on
liquidation.83
71. [1982] 3 All E.R. 1045 (C.A.) (Eng.).
72. [1987] 3 B.C.C. 535 (C.A.) (Eng.). The decision was reversed on the facts in the House of Lords, but
nothing that was said there detracted from the Court of Appeal's recognition of the duty.
73. (1976) 137 C.L.R. 1 (Ausd.).
74. Id. at 7.
75. [1985] 1 N.Z.L.R. 242 (C.A.).
76. Id. at 249. These are considered in greater detail below.
77. [1980] 1 W.L.R. 627 (H.L.) (Eng.).
78. Id. at 634.
79. 2002 S.L.T. 109 (Scot.).
80. [2005] B.C.C 783 (Ch.) (Eng).
81. Clydebank Football, 2002 S.L.T. at 126; Re MDA Inv. Mgmt., [2005] B.C.C. 783 at 805.
82. [1990] B.C.C. 600 (Ch.) (Eng.).
83. Id. at 600.
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Finch suggests that a way to resolve the tensions in this area is to read the dicta in
Brady v. Brady4 and Kinsela v. Russell Kinsela Pty Ltd."5 as being concerned with the
reorientation of focus from shareholder to creditor interests occurring around the
point of insolvency rather than the issue of exclusivity of interests, and for the
courts to stress that although creditor interests are to be considered on insolvency
or financial distress, they do not have to be the exclusive concern of directors, in
the same way as directors are entitled to look beyond shareholder interests before
insolvency. 6 Such an inclusive approach would sit well with the recent emphasis in
Great Britain on a more inclusive approach to the concept of the company gener-
ally, 7 but as noted above in relation to creditors with conflicting interests, there are
problems with an approach that requires directors to consider conflicting
interests."8
D. Is the Test Subjective or Objective?
As noted above, one of the problems identified regarding the duty as one owed to
the company is whether "directorial consideration of creditors' interests [is] to be
assessed subjectively or objectively[.]" s9 The answer to this question is uncertain."
Finch points out that a subjective approach would be consistent with principle but
poses problems of accountability although an objective approach could draw the
courts into an assessment of directors' business decisions.91 This issue is discussed
further below in the context of assessing the directors' knowledge of the circum-
stances that trigger the duty.
E. When Does the Duty Arise?
Another important area of uncertainty is identifying precisely when the duty arises.
Some of the early cases, including Walker v. Wimborne, 2 Lonrho Ltd. v. Shell Petro-
leum Co. Ltd.,93 and Winkworth v. Edward Baron Development Co. Ltd.,94 make no
reference to a requirement for the company to be insolvent or in financial distress
in order for the duty to arise. In another one of the early cases, Re Horsley & Weight
Ltd.,9s however, Templeman L.J. said that misfeasance on the part of the directors
would have been established if the company had been "doubtfully solvent" at the
84. [1987] 3 B.C.C. 535 (C.A.) (Eng.). The decision was reversed on the facts in the House of Lords, but
nothing that was said there detracted from the Court of Appeal's recognition of the duty.
85. (1986) 4 N.S.W.L.R. 722 (Austl.).
86. FINCH, CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW, supra note 1, at 503.
87. See infra notes 135-46 and accompanying text.
88. For a more detailed discussion, see, e.g., Riley, Directors' Duties, supra note 6, at 90.
89. FINCH, CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW, supra note 1, at 501.
90. For a detailed discussion, see CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW, supra note 6, at 189.
91. FINCH, CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW, supra note 1, at 501.
92. (1976) 137 C.L.R. 1 (Austl.).
93. [1980] 1 W.L.R. 627 (H.L.) (Eng.).
94. [1987] 1 All E.R. 114 (H.L.) (Eng.).
95. [1982] 3 All E.R. 1045 (C.A.) (Eng.).
VOL. 1 NO. 2 2007
DIRECTORS' DUTY TO CREDITORS OF A FINANCIALLY DISTRESSED COMPANY
relevant time,96 and the later cases have generally conditioned the existence of the
duty on the company's insolvency or certain circumstances short of insolvency.
Thus although insolvency or certain circumstances short of insolvency now seems
to be an accepted requirement for the duty to arise, uncertainty remains over the
precise point at which it does so because of the different terminology the judges
use.
Thus, in West Mercia Safetywear Ltd. v. Dodd,97 as noted above, Dillon L.J. con-
trasted the position in the earlier case of Multinational Gas and Petrochemical Co. v.
Multinational Gas and Petrochemical Services Ltd.,9" where "the company ... was
amply solvent," with the position in the instant case, where the company was insol-
vent.99 He then quoted with approval the dictum of Street J. in Kinsela v. Russell
Kinsela Pty Ltd.l 0 to the effect that the duty arises when a company is insolvent.'
In Brady v. Brady, °2 as noted above, Nourse J. said the interests of the company
were in reality the interests of existing creditors alone where the company was "in-
solvent, or even doubtfully solvent."' 3 In that case, the company in fact remained
solvent after the transaction that was said to give rise to the breach of duty. Nourse
J. went on to say, however, that "[t]he proportion of assets being removed" from
the company (one half) required the directors to ask themselves whether the re-
maining half would be sufficient to discharge the company's existing debts. 4 This
finding implies that directors are also required to consider the interests of creditors
where the company is solvent, but a transaction potentially affects that solvency.
This echoes the approach taken in Nicholson v. Permakraft (NZ) Ltd.,05 where
Cooke J. said that in his opinion, creditors were entitled to consideration when the
company was "insolvent, or near-insolvent, or of doubtful solvency, or if a contem-
plated payment or other course of action would jeopardise its solvency.'. °6 In Facia
Footwear Ltd. v. Hinchcliffe,0 7 Sir Richard Scott V-C, having quoted the familiar
passages from Walker v. Wimborne,'° Nicholson v. Permakraft (NZ) Ltd.,'°9and Kin-
96. Id. at 1056.
97. [1988] B.C.L.C. 250 (C.A.) (Eng.).
98. [1983] 2 All E.R. 563 (C.A.) (Eng.).
99. See West Mercia Safetywear, [1988] B.C.L.C. 250 at 252.
100. (1986) 4 N.S.W.L.R. 722 (Austl.).
101. West Mercia Safetywear, [19881 B.C.L.C. 250 at 253 (quoting Kinsela, 4 N.S.W.L.R. at 733). In Kinsela
v. Russell Kinsela Pty. Ltd., the question of whether the duty would arise in circumstances short of insolvency
was left open. Kinsela, 4 N.S.W.L.R. at 733. Of course, insolvency itself may have more than one meaning--this
is discussed further below.
102. [1987] 3 B.C.C. 535 (C.A.) (Eng.). The decision was reversed on the facts in the House of Lords, but
nothing that was said there detracted from the Court of Appeal's recognition of the duty.
103. Id. at 552.
104. Id.
105. [1985] 1 N.Z.L.R. 242 (C.A.).
106. Id. at 249.
107. [1998] 1 B.C.L.C. 218 (Eng.).
108. (1976) 137 C.L.R. 1 (Ausfl.).
109. (1985) 1 N.Z.L.R. 242 (C.A.).
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sela v. Russell Kinsela Pty Ltd.,"' went on to say that the duty arose in the instant
case because the company and the whole group of which it was part were in "a very
dangerous financial position."' " In Colin Gwyer & Associates Ltd. v. London Wharf
(Limehouse) Ltd.," 2 the duty was expressed as arising where the company was "in-
solvent or of doubtful solvency or on the verge of insolvency and it [is] the credi-
tors' money which [is] at risk.""' 3 In Re MDA Investment Management Ltd.," 4
however, Park J. said the duty arose where the company, "whether technically insol-
vent or not, is in financial difficulties to the extent that its creditors are at risk.""'
It is clear from these dicta that "insolvency" will trigger the duty, and most of the
cases contemplate that the duty will also be triggered in certain circumstances short
of insolvency. It is difficult, however, to identify with precision what such circum-
stances are, and even the concept of insolvency itself as a trigger for the duty is not
unproblematic. "Insolvency" is not a term of art and may be used to mean different
things, for example, balance sheet insolvency (where liabilities exceed assets) and
practical/liquidity insolvency (where the company is unable to pay its debts as they
fall due)." 6 None of the British cases, however, attempt to define what is meant by
insolvency in this context, and the vagueness of the concept as a basis for directors'
duty has been criticized." 7 It has also been pointed out that there can be real prac-
tical difficulties in identifying the point at which a company has become insolvent,
irrespective of which test is used,"' and it is unclear whether the directors' knowl-
edge of the insolvency is to be judged objectively or subjectively." 9 Furthermore, it
has been said that the point at which the company becomes insolvent is too late for
the duty to creditors to arise. 2
To focus on problems with the concept of insolvency as a trigger for the duty,
however, may be to miss the point. Grantham points out that insolvency is simply
110. (1986) 4 N.S.W.L.R. 722 (Austl.).
111. Facia Footwear, (1998) 1 B.C.L.C. 218 at 228.
112. [2003] 2 B.C.L.C. 153 (Ch.) (Eng.).
113. Id. at 154.
114. [2005] B.C.C 783 (Ch.) (Eng).
115. Id. at 805.
116. Both of these concepts are encompassed by the statutory test for insolvency in Insolvency Act, 1986, c.
6, § 123 (G.B.). Insolvency can be defined in other ways for other purposes: see, e.g., the test for wrongful
trading in Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 214 (G.B.).
117. For more detailed discussion on this issue, see generally Grantham, The Judicial Extension, supra note 6;
see also Andrew Keay, The Director's Duty to Take into Account the Interests Of Company Creditors: When Is It
Triggered?, 25 MEL. U. L. REv. 315, 322-29 (2001) [hereinafter Keay, The Director's Duty to Take into
Account].
118. See, e.g., Keay, The Director's Duty to Take into Account, supra note 117, at 322-26; Finch, Directors'
Duties Towards Creditors, supra note 6, at 23-24; FINCH, CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW, supra note 1, at 506.
119. See, e.g., Keay, The Director's Duty to Take into Account, supra note 117, at 325; FINCH, CORPORATE
INSOLVENCY LAW, supra note 1, at 506-07. Finch suggests that the test must be an objective one if creditors'
interests are to be adequately protected. Id.
120. Keay, The Director's Duty to Take into Account, supra note 117, at 326.
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the most obvious indication that the residual risk is no longer borne by the
shareholders. Thus the question posed by the court is not simply whether the
company is insolvent, but that given the distribution of risk does it continue to
be appropriate to regard the interests of shareholders as exclusively reflecting
the corporate interest.'
21
In other words, the critical issue is not the company's solvency or insolvency as
such, but whether the circumstances are such as to put the creditors' interests at
risk so that a shift in directors' duties to taking creditors' interests into account
(exclusively or otherwise'22) is justified. Such an approach is consistent with the
requirement in Nicholson v. Permakraft (NZ) Ltd. 2 ' and Brady v. Brady'24 that cred-
itors' interests be considered even where the company is solvent if a contemplated
payment or other action would jeopardize that solvency, and is clearly reflected in
dicta such as those in Colin Gwyer & Associates Ltd. v. London Wharf (Limehouse)
Ltd.'25 and Re MDA Investment Management Ltd.'26 referred to above, which focus
on the risk to the creditors.
Keay has suggested "that the most appropriate [formula for the] trigger [for the
duty] would be where the circumstances of a company are such that its directors
know, or can reasonably expect, that the action upon which they are going to em-
bark could lead to the insolvency of the company."'27 This test is objective, and he
argues, would require a court to take into account the particular circumstances in
each case "so that the more obvious it is that the creditors' money is at risk, the
lower the risk to which the directors are justified in exposing the company."'12 The
Company Law Review Steering Group, in formulating a possible statutory version
of the duty, provided for it to arise when a director knows, or would know but for
a failure of his to exercise due care and skill, that it is more likely than not that the
company will at some point be unable to pay its debts as they fall due.'29 The
proposals of the Company Law Review Steering Group are discussed in more detail
below, but it may be noted that this test is also objective and includes a definition
of insolvency. Both of these formulations continue to link the duty to the concept
of insolvency. In view of the previous discussion, however, it may be that a formula
that instead refers to the risk to (relevant) creditors' interests would reflect the real
121. Grantham, The Judicial Extension, supra note 6, at 15.
122. See supra notes 117-21.
123. 119851 1 N.Z.L.R. 242 (C.A.).
124. [19871 3 B.C.C. 535 (C.A.) (Eng.). The decision was reversed on the facts in the House of Lords, but
nothing that was said there detracted from the Court of Appeal's recognition of the duty.
125. [2003] 2 B.C.L.C. 153 (Eng.).
126. [2005] B.C.C 783 (Ch.) (Eng).
127. Keay, The Director's Duty to Take into Account, supra note 117, at 334.
128. Id.
129. Co. LAW REV. STEERING GROUP, FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at Annex C, Sched. 2, para. 8, at 347.
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focus of the duty more clearly, e.g., where the directors know or ought to have
known that their conduct would put the (relevant) creditors' interests at risk.
IV. THE COMPANY LAW REVIEW
As noted above, the Company Law Review Steering Group was set up by the gov-
ernment to review core company law in 1998130 and reported in 2001.' Directors'
duties were one of the main areas considered by the review. At the time the Com-
pany Law Review Steering Group was set up, the issue of regulating directors' con-
flicts of interests and formulating a statement of directors' duties was already under
consideration by the Law Commissions,'32 but it was intended that the Company
Law Review would look at the
wider issue ... [ofi whether directors' duty to act in the interests of their
company should be interpreted as meaning simply that they should act in the
interests of the shareholders, or whether they should also take account of other
interests, such as those of employees, creditors, customers, the environment,
and the wider community. 133
The Company Law Review Steering Group published its first consultation docu-
ment in February 1999.' This considered directors' duties as part of the wider
issue of the proper scope of company law, i.e., in whose interests companies should
be run. It noted that under the current legal framework, "[c]ompanies are formed
and managed for the benefit of shareholders, but subject to safeguards for the bene-
fit of actual and potential creditors."'33 The group also noted that directors are
obliged by their fiduciary duties to manage the business on behalf of the sharehold-
ers "honestly, in their best judgement, for the benefit of the company. This nor-
mally means for the benefit of the shareholders as a whole."'36 It said there is "an
overriding obligation to ensure that creditors are not wrongfully exposed to insol-
vency, through general duties imposed by company law and insolvency law and
special safeguards which apply to protect creditors in particular transactions (such
as distributions of profits or capital).' 3 7
130. See Co. LAW INVESTIGATIONS & DIRECTORATE, supra note 2.
131. See Co. LAW REV. STEERING GROUP, FINAL REPORT, supra note 3.
132. THE LAW COMM'N & THE SCOTTISH LAW COMM'N, COMPANY DIRECTORS: REGULATING CONFLICTS OF
INTERESTS AND FORMULATING A STATEMENT OF DUTIES, 1998 (Consultation Paper No. 153; Discussion Paper
No 105).
133. Co. LAW INVESTIGATIONS & DIRECTORATE, supra note 2, at para. 3.7.
134. Co. LAW REV. STEERING GROUP, MODERN COMPANY LAW FOR A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY: THE STRATE-
GIC FRAMEWORK (Feb. 1999), available at http://www.dti.gov.uk/files/file23279.pdf [hereinafter Co. LAW REV.
STEERING GROUP, THE STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK].
135. Id. at para. 5.1.4.
136. Id. at para. 5.1.5.
137. Co. LAW REV. STEERING GROUP, THE STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK, supra note 134, at para. 5.1.6 (citing
West Mercia Safetywear, [19881 B.C.L.C. 250 (C.A.) (Eng.)).
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The first consultation document considered two main approaches to the ques-
tion of the proper scope of company law. The first approach, the "enlightened
shareholder value" approach, regards the interests of the company as the interests
of the shareholders, but also recognizes that promoting the interests of the share-
holders will involve giving appropriate consideration to other interests. 3 ' The sec-
ond approach, the "pluralist" approach, seeks to redefine the interests of the
company in such a way that that concept encompasses several different interests,
not just the shareholders' interests. "' The consultation document recognized that
each of these approaches would require a different formulation of directors' duties
and sought views on various possible options. 4 ° It did not mention further, how-
ever, the directors' duty to creditors where the company is financially distressed.
Later that year, the Law Commissions published their Report on Regulating Con-
flicts of Interests and Formulating a Statement of Duties.'4' They recommended, inter
alia, a partial codification of the law on directors' duties and produced a draft
statutory statement of the main duties a director owes to his company. The draft
statement encompassed the main fiduciary duties and the duty of care and skill but
stressed that it was not a complete statement of a director's duties. The directors'
duty to creditors where the company is financially distressed was not included in
the draft statement, although its existence had been noted in the joint consultation
paper. 142
The Company Law Review Steering Group published a further consultation doc-
ument in March 2000.' This effectively adopted the enlightened shareholder value
approach to company law, which had been what the majority of consultees had
favored.14 1 So far as directors' duties were concerned, the consultation document
proposed, inter alia, to introduce "[a] statutory statement of principles, covering all
the directors' general duties," which would include a requirement for "directors to
achieve the success of the company for the benefit of shareholders by taking proper
account of all relevant considerations for that purpose" '45 and included a trial draft
statutory statement. 146 The first principle in the trial draft set out what it described
138. Id. at para. 5.1.12.
139. Id. at para. 5.1.13.
140. Id. at para. 5.1.10.
141. THE LAW COMM'N & THE SCOTTISH LAW COMM'N, COMPANY DIRECTORS: REGULATING CONFLICTS OF
INTERESTS AND FORMULATING A STATEMENT OF DUTIES (1999) (Law Com. No. 261; Scot. Law Com. No. 173).
142. THE LAW COMM'N & THE SCOTTISH LAW COMM'N, COMPANY DIRECTORS: REGULATING CONFLICTS OF
INTERESTS AND FORMULATING A STATEMENT OF DUTIES (1999) (Consultation Paper No. 153; Discussion Paper
No. 105), at para. 11.22-11.23. See also id. at para. 11.39, which deals with the issue of ratification where the
company is or may become insolvent.
143. Co. LAW REV. STEERING GROUP, MODERN COMPANY LAW FOR A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY: DEVELOPING
THE FRAMEWORK (Mar. 2000) [hereinafter Co. LAW REV. STEERING GROUP, DEVELOPING THE FRAMEWORK].
144. Id. at para. 2.11.
145. Id. at para. 2.19.
146. Id. at para. 3.40. The trial draft was based on, but was in many respects quite different from, the draft
statement produced by the Law Commissions.
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as the directors' duty of compliance and loyalty. It required a director to make
honest and proper use of his powers in accordance with the company's constitution
and to exercise his powers in good faith, taking into account both the short- and
the long-term consequences of his acts, to promote the success of the company for
the benefits of all its members. It went on to state that the director should consider,
so far as his duty of skill and care may require, the company's need to foster its
business relationships including those with its employees and suppliers and cus-
tomers, the effect of its operations on the environment, and its need to maintain a
reputation for high standards of business conduct.
The commentary on the trial draft said it was "intended to retain the current
relationship between the general duties of directors and the rest of the law."' "This
mean[t], for example, that insolvency law and the liabilities of directors for misfea-
sance in an insolvent winding up [would] be retained in their present overriding
form."'48 Consideration was given to the inclusion of an additional principle specif-
ically "requiring directors to consider foremost the interests of creditors in circum-
stances where the company is insolvent or threatened by insolvency."'49 The
commentary said that although "[a] number of British and Commonwealth court
judgments have suggested that such a principle exists [giving as examples Nicholson
v. Permakraft (NZ) Ltd. 5 ' and West Mercia Safetywear Ltd. v. Dodd1'], ... in reality
the cases seem capable of resolution on the basis of other principles and have been
strongly criticised on these grounds."" 2 It was also said that "[c]reditors should
have a remedy in a winding up or on the basis of their contracts and .. that the
prospect of personal liability to them on the part of directors has a salutary deter-
rent effect when the company is threatened with insolvency.""' Furthermore,
"[c]reditors' interests are already properly included within the inclusive loyalty
principle," the commentary said, and enactment of an additional principle would
"cut across section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986"'' 1 4 which "enables a liquidator
... in an insolvent winding up to recover a contribution from a director who failed
to take necessary action to protect creditors where insolvency was inevitable, . . . a
separate and detailed overriding provision which" there was no reason to change. 55
The inclusion of the additional principle in the statement was therefore rejected. 6
It was thought, however, that the position with respect to ratification might be
147. Id. at para. 3.42.
148. Id.
149. Id. at para. 3.72.
150. [19851 1 N.Z.L.R. 242 (C.A.).
151. [19881 B.C.L.C. 250 (C.A.) (Eng.).
152. Co. LAW REV. STEERING GROUP, DEVELOPING THE FRAMEWORK, supra note 143, at para. 3.72.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. Section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986 and its relationship with the duty are discussed further
below.
156. Id. at para 3.73.
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different, 5 7 and views were sought on whether a specific provision, effectively pre-
serving the current law, should be enacted to the effect "that misfeasance by direc-
tors cannot lawfully be ratified if [it] takes place when solvency is in doubt and the
effect would be to deprive creditors of relief in an insolvent winding up."'58 Views
were also sought on whether it would "be appropriate to include in Form 288 [con-
sent to act as a director] a separate warning that special principles become relevant
where a company is threatened by insolvency."" 9 What "special principles" were
meant was not specified, and it was therefore unclear whether this was a reference
only to insolvency law principles such as those contained in section 214 of the
Insolvency Act 1986 or included the common-law duty to creditors. It was also
unclear whether that duty was intended to survive, notwithstanding the decision to
exclude it from the statement of duties.
The next consultation document, published in November 2000,160 dealt with the
duty to creditors only very briefly. It said:
It is generally agreed that the duties [contained in the statement] must be
subject to the overriding duties of directors towards creditors in an insolvency
situation, but also that it is undesirable to lay down any detailed new rule in
this area; the law is developing and there is already a carefully balanced statu-
tory provision, which operates ex post in a liquidation, in the Insolvency Act
1986 section 214 (wrongful trading). We propose that this issue should be dealt
with in a general provision in the statement making it clear that the duties
operate subject to the other provisions of the Act and to the supervening obliga-
tions to have regard to the interests of creditors when the company is insolvent
or threatened by insolvency.'61
When the final report of the Company Law Review Steering Group was published
in 2001,62 however, the revised statement of directors' duties included provisions
on "the duties of directors to have regard to the interests of creditors where there is
a risk of insolvency .... "63 The reasons for this were explained in some detail.'64 It
was said that it was important to advise directors that they might need to consider
different factors "where the company is insolvent or threatened by insolvency [and
that failing] to do so would risk misleading directors by omitting an important part
157. Id.
158. Id. at para. 3.81.
159. Id. at para. 3.73.
160. Co. LAw REV. STEERING GROUP, MODERN COMPANY LAW FOR A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY: COMPLET-
ING THE STRUCTURE (Nov. 2000).
161. Id. at para. 3.12.
162. Co. LAW REV. STEERING GROUP, FINAL REPORT, supra note 3.
163. Id. at para. 3.11.
164. Id.
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of the overall picture." '65 Also noted was the belief that the earlier technical
problems and concerns about including the duty could be resolved.'66
The key issue for the Company Law Review Steering Group was when "the nor-
mal rule, that a company is to be run in the interests of its ...shareholders,
[should] be modified by an [additional] obligation to ... regard ... the interests of
creditors, or, in an extreme case, . . .to override the interests of [shareholders]
entirely .... ",167 The group noted the "risk that insolvency may occur unexpectedly
... [b]ut as insolvency becomes more imminent, the normal synergy between the
interests of members, . . .and of creditors . . .progressively disappears. As the
margin of assets reduces, so [does] the incentive on directors to avoid risky strate-
gies which endanger the assets .... 16 It noted that the present law provided two
solutions to this problem. The first was section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986, in
terms of which the directors are "liable to contribute towards the funds available to
creditors in an insolvent winding up, where they ought to have recognised that the
company had no reasonable prospect of avoiding insolvent liquidation and then failed
to take all reasonable steps to minimise the loss to creditors." 169 It was proposed
that this rule be included in the statement of directors' duties in order "to make
clear the point at which the normal duty of loyalty . . . is displaced,"' 7° and an
appropriate provision was included in the statement of directors' duties included in
the report. '7
The second solution was the duty to take into account the interests of "creditors
at an earlier stage in the onset of insolvency" recognized in case law." 2 The Com-
pany Law Review Steering Group suggested that this principle
would require directors, where they know or ought to recognise that there is a
substantial probability of an insolvent liquidation, to take such steps as they
believe, in their good faith judgement, appropriate to reduce the risk, without
undue caution and thus continuing also to have in mind the interests of
members.73
165. Id. at para. 3.12.
166. Id. at paras. 3.12, 3.13.
167. Id., at para 3.14.
168. Id. at para. 3.15.
169. Id. at para. 3.16 (emphasis in original). It should be noted that section 214 in fact requires the direc-
tors to have taken "every step" to minimize the loss to creditors, which is a somewhat different thing. Insol-
vency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 214 (G.B.).
170. Co. LAW REV. STEERING GROUP, FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at para. 3.16.
171. Id. at Annex C, Sched. 2, para. 8, at 347.
172. Id. at para. 3.17.
173. Id.
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It added that
[t]he greater the risk of insolvency in terms of probability and extent, the more
directors should take account of creditors' needs and the less those of members.
At the point where there is no reasonable prospect of avoiding insolvent liqui-
dation the interests of creditors become overriding under the first (section 214)
test. 174
Leaving aside the question of whether that is what the duty as currently formulated
would in fact require, the Company Law Review Steering Group thought that such
a rule might "be regarded as of considerable merit, at least in principle,"' and it
considered what it saw as the arguments for and against such a rule. In favor of the
rule was the argument that "[w]ithout it, directors would apparently, . . . be bound
to act in the ultimate interests of members until all reasonable prospect of avoiding
shipwreck had been lost. [Wlhere insolvency is less than inevitable but the risk is
substantial, directors should .... consider the interests of members and creditors
together." 71 Against it was the argument that it might have a "'chilling' effect [and]
... the risk that directors may run down or abandon a going concern at the first
hint of insolvency."' 77 It was recognized that the balanced judgment the rule would
require was "a difficult and indeterminate one [and that] [f]ears of personal liabil-
ity may lead to excessive caution."'78 It was said that the fact that "case law already
imposes such a duty is not a sufficient reason for retaining it unless ... it will not
in practice lead to failure of viable businesses."' It was thought, however, that the
concerns could at least to some extent be met by careful drafting, by requiring the
judgment to be subject to a subjective rather than an objective test and "by provid-
ing that the duty only arises when the directors ought in the exercise of due care
and skill to recognise that a failure to meet the company's liabilities is more proba-
ble than not.""'8 It was also noted that "where the business is threatened with insol-
vency there are procedures short of full liquidation open to directors which both
provide protection for creditors and preserve" the business.' The Company Law
Review Steering Group was, however, split on whether (a version of) the common-
law rule should be included in the statement of directors' duties.'82 Those against
174. Id.
175. Id. at para. 3.18.
176. Id.
177. Id. at para 3.19.
178. Id.
179. Id. at para. 3.20.
180. Id.
181. Id. There are two main rescue-oriented procedures in the Insolvency Act 1986, company voluntary
arrangements and administration. Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 1 (G.B.); Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 8 and
sched. BI (G.B.). Other options include a compromise or arrangement under section 425 of the Companies Act
1985. Companies Act, 1985, c. 6, § 425 (G.B.).
182. Co. LAW REV. STEERING GROUP, FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at para. 3.20.
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the inclusion of the rule thought that even with careful drafting, there would not be
adequate guidance for directors and liability would depend "on their being able to
discern an intermediate stage on the path to insolvency which is not identifiable in
reality."' 3 A draft provision was included in the statement of directors' duties to
reflect the views of those members who thought it should be included, and it was
recommended that further consultation take place." 4
It is worth setting out that draft provision in full:
At a time when a director of a company knows, or would know but for a failure
of his to exercise due care and skill, that it is more likely than not that the
company will at some point be unable to pay its debts as they fall due -
(a) the duty under paragraph 2 does not apply to him; and
(b) he must, in the exercise of his powers, take such steps (excluding any-
thing which would breach his duty under paragraph 1 or 5) as he believes
will achieve a reasonable balance between -
(i) reducing the risk that the company will be unable to pay its debts
as they fall due; and
(ii) promoting the success of the company for the benefit of its mem-
bers as a whole.
Notes
(1) What is a reasonable balance between those things at any time must be
decided in good faith by the director, but he must give more or less weight
to the need to reduce the risk according as the risk is more or less severe.
(2) In deciding in any case what would be most likely to promote the suc-
cess of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole, the director
must take account in good faith of all the material factors that it is practi-
cable in the circumstances for him to identify.
(3) The Notes to paragraph 2 apply also for the purposes of this paragraph.
(4) In this paragraph, "due care and skill" means the care, skill and dili-
gence required by paragraph 4. "'
The duty under paragraph 2 is a revised duty "to promote the success of the com-
pany for the benefit of its members as a whole,"8 6 while the duties under
paragraphs 1 and 5 are a revised duty to obey the constitution and other lawful
decisions and a revised rule on conflicts of interests respectively."7 The revised
duties under paragraphs 1 and 2 and the notes to paragraph 2 are derived from the
composite first principle in the trial draft contained in the March 2000 consultation
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at Annex C, Sched. 2, para. 8, at 347.
186. Id. at Annex C, Sched. 2, para. 2, at 345.
187. Id. at Annex C, Sched. 2, paras. 1, 5, at 345.
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paper discussed above.' The statement of duties was subject to revision through-
out the consultation process.
The draft provision certainly addressed many of the uncertainties in the present
law, although views on whether the ways in which it did were appropriate might
well differ. Thus, it provided that the duty is owed to the company and thereby
addressed any remaining uncertainty regarding this in the present law.'89 It pro-
vided for the duty to apply when it is more likely than not that the company will at
some point be unable to pay its debts, a concept that is defined in the Insolvency
Act 198619 and includes both balance sheet and practical/liquidity insolvency. It
thus addressed the uncertainty as to the point at which the duty arises in the pre-
sent law, although the practical problems in determining when that point has been
reached will remain, as concerned those arguing against the duty. It provided that
the test for identifying whether the relevant point has been reached is objective
although the test for complying with the duty itself is subjective and thus addressed
the uncertainties as to these issues in the present law. It provided for creditors'
interests to be considered alongside the interests of the shareholders and any other
relevant interests, with more weight being given to creditors' interests as the risk of
insolvency increases up to the point where the creditors' interests become overrid-
ing as a result of the duty under section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986.'' Thus, it
addressed at least partially the uncertainty as to the extent to which creditors' inter-
ests are to be taken into account and the relative weight to be given to the respective
interests in the present law, although problems of conflict could remain in practice.
It did not, however, address the need to specify which creditors should benefit from
the duty or give guidance on the issue of conflicting creditor interests, a serious
omission.
V. THE GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE
The government accepted the Company Law Review Steering Group's recommen-
dation to introduce a statutory statement of principles covering all directors' gen-
eral duties, but decided not to include either the proposed provision based on
section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986 or the draft provision based on the common
law duty in the statement.'92
188. Id. at Annex C, Sched. 2, paras. 1, 2, at 345; Id. at Explanatory Notes, paras. 11-19, at 351-52; Co. LAW
REV. STEERING GROUP, DEVELOPING THE FRAMEWORK, supra note 143, at Annex B, paras. 1-10, at 408- 10.
189. Co. LAW REV. STEERING GROUP, FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at para. 3.8.
190. Id. at Annex C, Explanatory Notes, para. 26, at 354. The explanatory notes which accompany the
statement of directors' duties make it clear that it is this definition which is to apply.
191. Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 214(4) (G.B.); Co. LAW REV. STEERING GROUP, FINAL REPORT, supra
note 3, at paras. 3.15-3.16.
192. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR TRADE & INDUSTRY, MODERNISING COMPANY LAW, Cm. 5553 (July 2002), at
paras. 3.2-3.7.
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The white paper Modernising Company Law, issued in July 2002, ' said that the
government had carefully considered both suggestions but concluded that the
weight of argument was against including any duties relating "to creditors in the
statutory statement."'94 In relation to the proposed provision based on section 214
of the Insolvency Act 1986, it was said that it would do the following: (i) "de-couple
the obligations imposed [under the section] from the remedies [available under
it],"'95 (ii) "unhelpfully conflate company and insolvency law," 96 and (iii) would be
only one of many duties and obligations owed by directors apart from company
law, which it would be inappropriate to single out for inclusion in the statutory
statement of duties.'97 It is suggested that the government's reasoning on this point
is sound and that there is no need to repeat a specific duty arising under insolvency
law in a general statement of directors' duties.'
In relation to the draft provision based on the common-law duty, it was said that
the arguments against the retention of this provision had been outlined by the
Review itself and that the need for directors to make "a finely balanced judgement,
[together with the fact that] fears of personal liability might lead to excessive cau-
tion . . . would run counter to the 'rescue culture' which the Government [was]
seeking to promote . . . .""' As has been pointed out elsewhere, the government's
reasoning here is perhaps less sound. 00 First, Keay argues that directors might
equally well be cautious out of fear of being held liable for wrongful trading under
section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986,21' although, of course, under that provision
the duty arises only at a later stage.20 2 It might be added that directors might
equally well be cautious out of fear of disqualification.0 3 Second, because it is
widely accepted that the earlier a rescue process is commenced the better the
chances it will succeed, if the duty to consider creditors at an earlier stage caused
the directors, as it arguably could, to take earlier action to institute a rescue process
in appropriate cases, this would in fact benefit rather than run counter to the res-
cue culture.0 4
193. Id.
194. Id. at para. 3.10.
195. Id. at para. 3.12.
196. Id. at para. 3.13.
197. Id. at paras. 3.12, 3.13. It was considered that the comprehensive guidance for directors that the gov-
ernment was proposing be prepared would enable directors' attention to be drawn to their additional duties
under the insolvency legislation. Id.
198. Id. at para. 3.13.
199. Id. at para. 3.11.
200. Keay, Directors Taking Into Account, supra note 1, at 306.
201. Id.
202. See Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 214(1) (G.B.) (when the director knew or ought to have known that
the company could not reasonably avoid insolvent liquidation.).
203. Disqualification is discussed infra.
204. See also Keay, Directors Taking into Account, supra note 1, at 306.
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The white paper offered an alternative approach to the question of creditors,
which was to include mention of them, possibly "by reference to the company's
obligations to them,"2 ' as among the factors to which directors must have regard,
where appropriate, in complying with the revised duty to promote the company's
interests for the benefit of its members as a whole.2"6 It was recognized, however,
that this would not achieve the effect the draft provision was intended to achieve,2"7
and it was not taken forward.
The explanatory notes accompanying the statement of directors' duties in the
Company Law Review Steering Group's final report made it dear that if the draft
provision was not adopted in some form, consideration would need to be given to
whether the common-law principle should be repealed or left to develop.0 ' The
second option would leave the statement of directors' duties incomplete, although
there would be the possibility of including a suitable warning for directors in that
event. As noted, the white paper rejected the draft provision,2 9 but did not specifi-
cally address what should be done about the existing common law. The draft Com-
pany Law Reform Bill that was to implement the proposed changes to company law
published in July 2005, however, effectively provided for the common law to sur-
vive: the provision setting out the director's (further refined) duty to promote the
success of the company for the benefit of its members provided that the duty was
"subject to any enactment or rule of law requiring directors, in certain circum-
stances, to consider or act in the interests of creditors of the company. 2 °10 The
explanatory material accompanying the draft stated that this provision:
recognises that the normal rule that a company is to be run for the benefit of its
members as a whole may need to be modified where the company is insolvent
or threatened by insolvency. In doing so, it preserves the current legal position
that, when the company is insolvent or is nearing insolvency, the interests of
the members should be supplemented, or even replaced, by those of the
creditors.2"
The Company Law Reform Bill introduced into Parliament on November 1, 2005
followed the terms of the draft in this respect."' The Guidance on Key Clauses
issued with the Bill made it clear that "[t]he statutory duties [embodied in the bill]
205. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR TRADE & INDUS., supra note 192, at para. 3.14.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Co. LAw REV. STEERING GROUP, FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at Annex C, Explanatory Notes, para. 26,
at 354.
209. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR TRADE & INDUS., supra note 192, at para. 3.10.
210. Company Law Reform Bill (Draft), 2005, H.L. Bill [34], § B3(4) (G.B.).
211. Id. at § B19.
212. Id. at § 156(4).
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do not cover all the duties that a director may owe to the company."2"3 It further
stated that other duties are imposed elsewhere in legislation or remain uncodified,
specifically referring in the latter context to "any duty to consider the interests of
creditors in times of threatened insolvency."214 It also specifically stated that the
inclusion of the provision to the effect that the director's duty to promote the
success of the company for the benefit of its members is subject to any enactment
or rule of law requiring directors, in certain circumstances, to consider or act in the
interests of creditors of the company would leave the common law to develop in
this area."' That provision has now been enacted in the form of section 172(3) of
the Companies Act 2006.216 This approach may permit more flexibility in develop-
ing the duty than a statutory provision would have provided. It is suggested, how-
ever, that since the duty has been retained, a specific provision in the legislation-
providing that it was carefully thought through and drafted-would have been
more satisfactory because it could have resolved at least some of the present uncer-
tainties surrounding the duty. These uncertainties will now have to await clarifica-
tion by the courts as and when the opportunity arises. The provision will, however,
at least put directors on notice that they have the duty, even if they cannot deter-
mine its content with certainty.
VI. THE ROLE OF THE DUTY IN MODERN BRITISH LAW
The directors' duty to creditors thus remains part of British law. It may be asked,
however, whether it has a real role to play. A role for the duty has been emphati-
cally refuted by Sealy.2 7 The law already gives the courts ample scope to deal with
all potential abuses of trust by company directors, he has said, and even if that had
not been so before 1986, the (then) new wrongful-trading provision in section 214
of the Insolvency Act 1986 would allow for developments on a statutory footing
that were properly integrated with insolvency law as a whole.218 Other commenta-
tors, however, have pointed out that this may be incorrect and that the duty does
213. Company Law Reform Bill, 2005, H.L. Bill [341, § 305, available at http://www.publications.
parliament.uk/pa/ld2005O6/ldbils/0341en/06034x-e.htm.
214. Id. at § 305.
215. Id. at §§ 329-30.
216. Companies Act 2006, c. 46 (G.B.). The Act received Royal Assent on 8 November 2006 but is being
brought into force gradually. It is expected that the main provisions relating to directors will come into force in
October 2007; see DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPANIES ACT 2006: A CON-
SULTATION DOCUMENT (Feb. 2007), Annex A, available at http://www.dti.gov.uklconsultations/page37980.html.
217. See Sealy, Directors' Duties-An Unnecessary Gloss, supra note 4, at 175-77; Sealy, Personal Liability of
Directors and Officers, supra note 4, at 488.
218. Sealy, Directors' Duties-An Unnecessary Gloss, supra note 4, at 177; Sealy, Personal Liability of Direc-
tors and Officers, supra note 4, at 494, 496.
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have a role to play in supplementing other provisions for the protection of credi-
tors' interests.21 9
A variety of provisions to protect creditors' interests are built into both company
and insolvency law. This Article concentrates on the main protections in insolvency
law, because it is with those provisions that an overlap is most likely to occur where
the directors of a financially distressed company are in breach of their duty to take
account of creditors' interests.220
England, Wales, and Scotland all have relevant insolvency-law provisions, some
of which are common to both jurisdictions and others of which apply only in one
or another. The relevant provisions in England and Wales have recently been con-
sidered in detail in this context by Keay,22' who identifies the most important pro-
visions as the wrongful-trading provision in section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986;
the provisions on preferences and transactions at an undervalue in sections 239
and 238 of the Insolvency Act 1986, respectively; the provision on transactions
defrauding creditors in section 423 of the Insolvency Act 1986; the fraudulent trad-
ing provision in section 213 of the Insolvency Act 1986; and the misfeasance provi-
sion (as it is commonly known) in section 212 of the Insolvency Act 1986.222 Of
these, sections 212, 213, and 214 also apply in Scotland,223 although sections 238,
239, and 423 do not.2 4 There are, however, broadly equivalent provisions to sec-
tions 238 and 239 in Scotland in the form of the statutory provisions on gratuitous
alienations and unfair preferences in sections 242 and 243 of the Insolvency Act
1986,225 respectively, and there are also common-law provisions for challenging
gratuitous alienations and unfair preferences. There is no direct equivalent of sec-
tion 423 of the Insolvency Act 1986 in Scotland.
It seems appropriate to start with the wrongful-trading provision in section 214
of the Insolvency Act 1986 because this section has sometimes been said to pre-
clude the need for any duty to creditors at common law226 and has already been
referred to above. The section applies where a company has gone into insolvent
219. See, e.g., Riley, Directors' Duties, supra note 6, at 90; Finch, Insolvency and the Unsecured Creditor, supra
note 6, at 94, 97, 111; CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW, supra note 6, at ch. 9; Keay, The Duty of Directors,
supra note 1, at 380; Keay, Another Way of Skinning a Cat, supra note 1, at 7.
220. For a good discussion of the main protections in company law, see generally Ellis Ferran, Creditors'
Interests and 'Core' Company Law, 20 Co. LAW. 314 (1999) (U.K.). Changes to several of these provisions will
be made by the Companies Act 1986, c. 46 (G.B.), but the principle of creditor protection has generally been
maintained.
221. Keay, The Duty of Directors, supra note 1, at 380; Keay, Another Way of Skinning a Cat, supra note 1, at
3-8.
222. See also Finch, Insolvency and the Unsecured Creditor, supra note 6 (discussing various provisions of the
Insolvency Act 1986).
223. Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, §§ 212-14 (G.B.).
224. Id. at §§ 238-39, 423.
225. Compare Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, §§ 238-39 (Eng. & Wales) with Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45,
§§ 242-43 (Scot.).
226. Sealy, Directors' Duties-An Unnecessary Gloss, supra note 4, at 177; Sealy, Personal Liability of Direc-
tors and Officers, supra note 4, at 494, 496.
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liquidation and provides that where a director (or former director) knew or ought
to have known at some time before the commencement of the liquidation that the
company had no reasonable prospect of avoiding insolvent liquidation, he is "liable
to make such contribution (if any) to the company's assets as the court thinks
proper."227 There is a defense where the director "took every step [he ought to have
taken] with a view to minimi[z]ing the potential loss to the company's creditors." '228
The director's conduct is assessed by a dual objective/subjective test that assumes
that the director has the general knowledge, skill, and experience that may reasona-
bly be expected of a person carrying out the director's functions and the general
knowledge, skill, and experience that the director has.229 Although Sealy has said
that the section covers the same ground as the duty to creditors,23 this is not in fact
the case. In particular, as the Company Law Review Steering Group discussed, the
common-law duty arises at an earlier stage than the duty under section 214.211 In
addition, section 214 is available only on insolvent liquidation, whereas a breach of
duty, although perhaps most likely to be pursued on liquidation,232 can be pursued
outside it, for example, by an administrator or receiver. 2" Furthermore, as the case
law on section 214 has developed, practical problems with bringing actions under
the section have been identified,2 14 although it may be noted in passing that not all
of these problems, some of which have now been resolved, would necessarily have
arisen in a Scottish context.2 3 ' Nonetheless, it is suggested that Keay is justified in
concluding that section 214 has not lived up to its early promise and that a wrong-
ful-trading action may sometimes fall short, but an action for breach of duty could
succeed.236
Similar points can be made in relation to the provisions on preferences and
transactions at undervalue in sections 239 and 238, respectively, of the Insolvency
Act 1986. Section 239 applies on liquidation and administration, and provides that
"[wihere [a] company has, at the relevant time[,] . ..given a preference to any
[other] person .... the court shall ... make such order as it thinks fit for restoring
the position to what it would have been if the" preference had not been given.237 A
preference is given where the company does anything that puts a creditor in a
227. Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 214(1)-(2) (G.B.).
228. Id. at § 214(3).
229. Id. at § 214(4).
230. Sealy, Personal Liability of Directors and Officers, supra note 4, at 488.
231. See supra notes 167-190 and accompanying text.
232. See Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 212 (G.B.).
233. Keay, The Duty of Directors, supra note 1, at 394.
234. For a detailed description of the main problems, see id. at 389-9 1.
235. In particular, it was a problem in England and Wales that the costs of bringing an action did not count
as expenses of the liquidation. This problem has now been solved by amending the provisions of r 4.218 of the
Insolvency Rules 1986, SI 1986/1925 but never arose in Scotland because the Scottish rules were worded differ-
ently. See Insolvency (Scotland) Rules 1986, S1 1986/1915, r 4.67.
236. Keay, The Duty of Directors, supra note 1, at 393-94.
237. Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 239(2)-(3) (Eng. & Wales).
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better position than he would have been in an insolvent liquidation, and the com-
pany was influenced by a desire to put the creditor in that better position.238 The
preference must have been given within the six months before liquidation or ad-
ministration, unless it was given to a connected person.239 In this case, the time
limit is two years, and the company must have been insolvent at the time of the
preference or been rendered insolvent as a result of it.24° Section 238 also applies on
liquidation and administration and provides that "[w]here the company has at a
relevant time ... entered into a transaction ... at an undervalue, . . . the court shall
... make such order as it thinks fit for restoring the position to what it would have
been if the company had not entered into that transaction. '24' There is a defense
where the transaction was entered into "in good faith and for the purpose of carry-
ing on [the company's] business, and that at the time it [was entered into] there
were reasonable grounds for believing that the transaction would benefit the com-
pany.24 2 The transaction must have taken place within two years before liquidation
or administration, and again the company must have been insolvent at the time of
the transaction or rendered insolvent as a result of it, although this is presumed in
the case of a transaction with a connected person.43 Unlike section 214, sections
239 and 238 are available on administration as well as liquidation,24 4 but, as already
noted, a breach of duty can be pursued outside these processes.245 Again, a number
of practical problems with bringing actions under these sections have been identi-
fied. 246 It may be noted again in passing that not all of these problems would neces-
sarily arise in a Scottish context, mainly because the equivalent provisions are
different in a number of important respects. 47 Nonetheless, it is suggested that
Keay is justified in concluding that a breach-of-duty action might be possible where
the person against whom the proceedings would be brought is impecunious but
the directors are not.2 48
The provision on transactions defrauding creditors in section 423 of the Insol-
vency Act 1986 is much broader in scope than the other avoidance provisions in a
number of respects: it is not confined to insolvency, there are no time limits, and
an action may be brought by any creditor. 49 It relates, however, only to transac-
238. Id. at § 239(4)(b).
239. Id. at § 240(l)(b).
240. Id. at § 240(1)(a).
241. Id. at § 238(1)-(3).
242. Id. at § 238(5).
243. Id. at § 240(1)(a)-(b).
244. Id. at § 238(1), § 239(1).
245. Keay, The Duty of Directors, supra note 1, at 398.
246. See id. at 397-99.
247. For example, one of the main problems with a preference action under section 239 of the Insolvency
Act 1986 is the need to show that the company was influenced by a desire to prefer, but there is no need to
establish such an intention to prefer in the context of an unfair preference action in Scotland. Compare Insol-
vency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 239(5) (Eng. & Wales) with Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 243 (Scot.).
248. Keay, The Duty of Directors, supra note 1, at 398, 400.
249. See Insolvency Act, at § 423.
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tions at an undervalue, and it must be established that the person entering the
transaction entered it for the purpose of putting assets beyond the reach of an
actual or potential creditor or otherwise prejudicing such a person."' Establishing
this last requirement in particular has been identified as a problem with this provi-
sion that would not occur in the context of an action for breach of duty.2"'
The fraudulent-trading provision in section 213 of the Insolvency Act 1986 ap-
plies only on liquidation.2 2 It provides that where any of the company's business
"has been carried on with intent to defraud creditors of the company or creditors of
any other person, or for any fraudulent purpose, ... any persons who were know-
ingly parties [to the fraudulent trading] are to be liable to make such contributions
(if any) to the company's assets as the court thinks proper."23 As with section 214,
section 213 is available only on insolvent liquidation,5 4 whereas a breach of duty,
although perhaps most likely to be pursued on liquidation, can be pursued outside
it.25 Furthermore, as with the other sections considered, there are well-known dif-
ficulties with the section and a number of practical problems with bringing actions
under it.2 6 Again, it may be noted in passing that not all of the practical problems
would necessarily arise in a Scottish context, 257 but once again it is suggested that
Keay is justified in concluding that a liquidator would, where possible, seek to bring
any action under a different provision.5
The misfeasance provision in section 212 of the Insolvency Act 1986 applies on
liquidation.259 Unlike the other provisions discussed, it does not create any substan-
tive rights but provides a procedural mechanism for enforcing an existing claim,
including a claim for breach of duty.2& It is available where a director "has misap-
plied or retained, or become accountable for, any money or other property of the
company, or been guilty of any misfeasance or breach of any fiduciary or other
duty in relation to the company. 2 6' An application under the section may be made
by the liquidator, a creditor or a contributory, but in all cases any property or
monies recovered will form part of the company's assets available for distribution
to all creditors. 62 The successful action for breach of duty in West Mercia
Safetywear Ltd. v. Dodd263 was brought under this section.264
250. Id. at § 423(1).
251. Keay, The Duty of Directors, supra note 1, at 401.
252. See Insolvency Act § 213(2).
253. Id. at § 213(1)-(2).
254. Id. at § 213(1), § 214(2)(a).
255. Keay, The Duty of Directors, supra note 1, at 402-03.
256. Id. at 403.
257. The difficulties with the wording of the section itself would, however, be equally applicable.
258. Keay, The Duty of Directors, supra note 1, at 402-03.
259. Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 212(1) (G.B.).
260. Id. at § 212(2).
261. Id. at § 212(l)(c).
262. Id. at § 212(3).
263. [19881 B.C.L.C. 250 (C.A.) (Eng.).
264. Id. at 250, 251.
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Having reviewed these provisions, Keay concludes, rightly, that there are defi-
ciencies and weaknesses in all of them. and that absent a breach-of-duty claim,
there have been and will continue to be cases where liquidators would have failed
and "creditors would have been prejudiced."266 He concludes further that although
legislative provisions "such as section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986, mean that the
ambit of the duty does not have to be as broad as was once thought, the duty is not
irrelevant and has not been relegated to the role of a 'bit part."'2 67 In other words,
the duty still has an important role to play. This conclusion presupposes, of course,
that creditors deserve the additional protection the duty brings. That question is a
whole debate in itself and lies beyond the scope of this Article. Still, it may be noted
that Keay has argued, consistently with his views discussed above, that the limited
protection the duty brings can be so justified. 68
Also relevant in this context are the provisions of the Company Directors Dis-
qualification Act 1986, which provides for the disqualification of directors and cer-
tain other persons on a variety of grounds.269 Unlike the other provisions discussed
above, this Act is not concerned with providing a remedy for creditors as such,
although it does make provision for personal liability where a person has acted in
breach of a disqualification.270 It does, however, enhance creditor protection by
removing from the system directors whose conduct falls short of the appropriate
standards and by discouraging such conduct in serving directors for fear of disqual-
ification. Considerations of space preclude a detailed discussion of disqualification
here, but it may be noted that under section 6 of the Company Directors Disquali-
fication Act 1986, the court has a duty to disqualify a director or former director of
a company that has at any time become insolvent where his conduct as a director of
that company, either alone or together with his conduct as a director of any other
company or companies, makes him unfit to be concerned in the management of a
company. 7' In determining whether a person's conduct makes him unfit to be
concerned in the management of a company, the court is directed to have regard,
in particular, for the matters mentioned in Part I of Schedule 1 to the Act272 and,
where the company has become insolvent, to the matters mentioned in Part II of
265. Keay, The Duty of Directors, supra note 1, at 405.
266. Id. at 406.
267. Id. at 409.
268. See Keay, Contractarian Concerns, supra note 1, at 680- 87; Keay, A Theoretical Analysis, supra note 1, at
342-44.
269. Company Directors Disqualification Act, 1986, c. 46 (G.B.).
270. Id. at §§ 13-15.
271. Id. § 6(2). A company becomes insolvent for this purpose where it "goes into liquidation at a time
when its assets are insufficient for the payment of its debts and other liabilities and the expenses of the winding
up, [when] the company enters administration, or [when] an administrative receiver of the company is ap-
pointed." Id. In each such case, the relevant insolvency practitioner has a duty to report on the conduct of the
directors/former directors of the company to the Secretary of State, who will then decide whether it is expedi-
ent in the public interest to make an application for disqualification under section 6. Id. at § 7(3)- (4).
272. Id. at sched. 1, part I.
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Schedule 1,2" as well. The matters mentioned in Part I of Schedule 1 include "[a] ny
misfeasance or breach of any fiduciary or other duty by the director in relation to
the company." '274 The courts have held that where a director causes or permits a
company to trade where he knows or ought to know that there is no reasonable
prospect of creditors' being paid, can amount to unfitness justifying disqualifica-
tion under section 6 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986.275 Courts
have reasoned that the director has thereby breached his duties to the company,
even where such conduct would fall short of giving rise to liability for wrongful
trading under section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986.276 The duty therefore has an
important role to play in this context as well, and has perhaps been better devel-
oped by the courts here than in the context of specific actions for breach of the
duty.
VII. CONCLUSION
Although the directors' duty to the creditors of a financially distressed company is
now generally regarded as well established in principle in British law, important
aspects of it still remain more or less unclear. These include whether the duty is a
direct or an indirect one, which creditors should be owed the duty, the extent to
which creditors' interests are to be taken into account, whether the test is subjective
or objective, when would the duty arise, and whether the directors' knowledge of
when the duty arises is to be tested subjectively or objectively.
The Company Law Review Steering Group in 2001 was split on the question of
whether a version of the duty should be enacted in statute as part of a general
statement of directors' duties. 77 It did, however, produce for consideration a draft
of such a provision that addressed many, if not all, of the present uncertainties
surrounding the duty. 7 The government decided not to proceed with such a pro-
vision, and the common-law duty has instead been preserved and left to develop.
This decision is arguably unsatisfactory, because the uncertainties surrounding the
duty will therefore remain and will have to be resolved by the courts if and when
the opportunity permits. An important opportunity to clarify this area of the law
has therefore been lost.
If the government rejected a statutory provision, was it right nonetheless to re-
tain the common law? It has been seen that despite other provisions aimed at pro-
273. Id. at sched. 1, part II.
274. Id. at sched. 1, part I, para. 1.
275. See Re Bath Glass Ltd., [1988] 4 B.C.C. 130 (Ch.) (Eng.); Re Sevenoaks Stationers (Retail) Ltd., [19911
Ch 164 (C.A.) (Eng.).
276. See generally A. WALTERS AND M. DAVIS-WHITE, DIRECTORS' DISQUALIFICATION & BANKRUPTCY RE-
STRICTIONS (Sweet & Maxwell London 2005); MITHANI, DIRECTORS' DISQUALIFICATION (Butterworth's 1998).
A finding of liability for wrongful trading is a separate ground for disqualification. See, e.g., Company Direc-
tors' Disqualification Act, 1986, c. 46, § 10(1).
277. Co. LAW REV. STEERING GROUP, FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at para. 3.13.
278. Id. at annex C, sched. 2, § 8, at 347.
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tecting creditors' interests, gaps remain that the duty might be able to fill. In
addition, it has a role to play in the context of disqualification. Arguably, therefore,
it does still have an important role to play in the modern law if the additional
protection it can give creditors is seen to be justified.
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